1 Introduction strategic interests (Smith, Humm and Fontanel, 1985; Krause, 1991; Skons, 2000) , and international relations during the Cold War have alimented this perception. The market for arms lacks an international regulation, being therefore subject to each country's sovereignty. Arms export licenses are exclusively granted by governmental agencies (mostly inter-ministerial committees) and can be revoked by them.
2 Even if nowadays licenses for certain destinations are automatically granted, in virtually all exporting countries a relevant share of the arms industry is state property, and arms orders boost the employment of industrial regions (Martin, Hartley and Stafford, 1999) .
3 A welldocumented case of public subsidies are the export credits granted by the UK Export Credit Governmental Department: Martin (1999) concludes that in the UK each job generated by arms export is subsidized by just under 2000 pounds per annum and that a one-third reduction in UK defense exports would save the taxpayer 76 million pounds per annum at 1995 prices. For a detailed overview of the national controls system of the twenty major MCW exporters see the Appendix B.
Given that arms trade is also a foreign policy issue and that governments control arms exports through different channels, my aim is to test how internal politics affects arms export decisions. In Section 4 I first provide evidence that MCW exports of democratic and autocratic regimes differ, and then exclude from the sample major non-democratic producers to concentrate on the political characteristics of democracies only. In the empirical specification, the dependent variable is the amount of MCW transferred and the equation is estimated for years , that is, the core of Cold War and the years right after. The choice of a TOBIT model is consistent with the nature of data.
The results give original insights into arms trade suggesting that, ceteris paribus, the government in power being right-wing significantly increases the quantity of MCW exported. This may reflect a general right-wing tendency to lower trade barriers with its consequences on exports deregulation, or a greater support toward the national ar-mament sector in terms of subsidies (perhaps through partly/fully government-funded research) or offset agreements.
4 I also find that higher political competition in the parliament (as expressed by the Herfindahl index for parties' seats) is associated with higher MCW exports. Finally, data suggests that MCW trade varies during the electoral campaign, perhaps because of the scrutiny of public opinion: executives serving the last year of their current term tend to increase MCW exports if they cannot be re-elected, and to decrease MCW exports if they can run for re-election.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the model is briefly described, while Section 3 explains data and variables in use. In Section 4 results are presented, and Section 5 concludes. Tables and figures are presented in the Appendix A. Appendix B contains an overview of arms national export control systems for the twenty major exporters.
The Model
The panel is unbalanced and evolves along three dimensions: the dependent variable arms ijt is the MCW flow from country i to country j at time t. Since the amount of arms traded in a given year equals zero for most observations, I depart from the previous literature using a TOBIT model of the form arms ijt = arms * ijt if arms * ijt > 0 0 if arms * ijt ≤ 0 for
where γ i , δ j and φ t are fixed effects and the covariates x ijt explain both the latent variable arms * ijt and the observed outcome. Fixed effects are a safe choice since γ i , δ j and φ t are likely to be correlated with the regressors. Moreover, they account by construction for time-invariant country characteristics and time trends.
I first consider all twenty major exporters as ranked by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which alone account for 97% of total MCW exports for the period 1975-2004. 5 These countries -in order of importance-are: the US, the USSR, the UK, France, Russia, China, West Germany (FRG), Czechoslovakia, Italy, Unified Germany (GMY), Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Poland, Israel, Spain, Ukraine, Switzerland, Brazil, Norway. Out of these twenty exporters, later on I exclude the non-democratic ones: the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland 1975 -1988 , and Brazil 1975 -1984 . The remaining democracies still account for more than 65% of total MCW exports for the period . On the import side all independent countries recognized by UN are included as potential importers, subject to data availability.
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A last issue to be discussed is the timing of the trade. Many categories of arms are grouped under the MCW label and procedures vary from country to country (see Appendix B), however responses to political changes seem to be relatively fast. Even if the production of some arms can take up to a few years, licenses are required not for the negotiation of the contract but for the delivery.
7 When licenses to delivery arms are granted, they expire in a reasonably short time (within one year for France and Italy). Moreover, licenses can be revoked by the governmental agency under a wide range of circumstances. For all those reasons I stick to the specification in Equation (1) where the response is assumed to be immediate (i.e., within the year): if anything, this is a conservative choice underestimating the size of the overall effect. Specifications 5 Even this way the dependent variable is zero in 91% of the observations: if I add more exporters the data become intractable.
6 Importing and exporting countries are classified as in the Correlated of War Project 2005. The only exception is that I code separately Russia and the USSR (USSR data goes until 1991 included, and Russia from 1992 onwards). Whenever data are available I have also included potential importers which have never traded MCW (Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, East Timor, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, San Marino, Sao Tome e Principe, Santa Lucia, Nauru).
7 A license is required to open negotiations in few specific cases, enumerated in what follows. In Germany an authorization to negotiate is necessary only if intermediaries located in foreign territory are involved. In Italy, companies must be in the national register of arms exporting companies to be able to contract for exports of military items. In the US negotiation is free, except if technical information relevant for national security is revealed in the course of contract. In France licenses are required both for negotiating and delivering arms; in any case, the two procedures are independently conducted and both licenses expire within one year, which is a reasonably short time length.
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Data and Variables Description
This section illustrates the main features of the data and the variables in use. The regressors' subscripts remind the dimensions of variation (i for exporter, j for importer, t for time). The time span goes from 1975-2004 to 1980-2004 , depending on the specification.
Data on MCW trade come from the Arms Transfers Database by the SIPRI. MCW consist in aircrafts, armored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships. SIPRI data register MCW transfers to sovereign countries (as well as international organizations, rebel groups, factions and non-governmental armed forces, which appear under a recipients heading different from the country's central government). In order to be registered in the SIPRI dataset weapons must be transferred voluntarily by the supplier and must have a military purpose; time of transfer refers to the moment when delivery is registered. Units of arms are computed according to a trend indicator value system which reflects not economic prices but amounts transferred: the weapons are evaluated for their technical parameters, so that similar weapons have similar scores.
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This feature improves the quality of the information in several ways. First, in many cases no reliable data on the economic value of a transfer are available. Second, even if the value of a transfer is known, it is in almost every case the total value of a deal, which may include not only the weapons themselves but also other related items (e.g., spare parts, armament or ammunition, specialized vehicles, software changes to existing systems, or training). Third, even if the value of a transfer is known, important details about the financial arrangements of the transfer (e.g., credit/loan conditions and discounts) are usually not known. On the other side, the SIPRI trend indicator not only registers arms sales, but also other forms of supply including weapons transferred as political aid at a zero price. This trend measure is consistent with the focus of my study: since MCW are also policy instruments, price and market laws would just tell a part of the story.
9 In all specifications that follow, the dependent variable arms ijt is the SIPRI MCW flow from country i to country j at time t (1 unit corresponds to 1 SIPRI point). Only sovereign countries are taken into account, while other entities such as international organizations and non-governmental armed forces are omitted. The SIPRI data are also used to build the variable M CW exports it , which is calculated as the total MCW flow out of the exporter country at time t and is aimed to capture industry fluctuations (1 unit corresponds to 1000 SIPRI points).
Data on democracy come from the Polity IV Project by the Center for Global Policy of George Mason University. I use the composite polity indicator that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic regime) to +10 (strong democracy): democracy it is a dummy equal to one if the exporter's polity indicator is greater than zero. I adopt this dichotomous classification for the sake of simplicity, but it does not affect the results since the distribution is almost bimodal: in 96% of the cases where democracy it equals zero the polity indicator is equal to or smaller than -4, and similarly for 96% of the cases where democracy it equals one the polity indicator is equal to or greater than +6. In some specification I also control for the importer's democracy score jt (in the original scale from -10 to +10). The transition out of Cold War coincided with the so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) : between 1987 and 1997, 54 countries went through a process of (full or partial) democratization (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008) . This is also reflected in the Polity IV data: on the total sample of 168 countries, the median polity score for period 1975-2004 is 0, while the median polity score for period 1990-2004 is 5.
Variables reflecting political conditions come from the World Bank Development Research Group's Database of Political Institutions, DPI2006 (Beck et. al. 2001) . 9 The only alternative source of arms trade data is the World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) published by the US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance. The WMEAT measure also covers small weapons and, unlike the SIPRI index, is an economic value measure registering arms bundles sold on the commercial market. As Brzoska (1982) points out, the WMEAT measure has several major problems. First, coverage is worse than in the SIPRI measure. Second, in the many cases where prices are not available, a cost model estimated for US arms industry has been applied to other countries including the USSR, which leads to serious biases as the industrial and employment structure of the two countries are not comparable. Third, the WMEAT measure underestimates the role of western suppliers other than the US and the USSR. Moreover, WMEAT data are not based on open sources of information but on statistics from US intelligence service.
This dataset classifies the chief executives in power as one of the followings, depending on their economic policy: Right (conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing), Left (communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing) , Center (for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist, e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). I use two dummies centrist it and lef t it to account for center and left exporter's executives, while the Right dummy is omitted. Just to mention a few examples: all USSR executives are classified as left, while for what regards the US Carter (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) and Clinton (1993 Clinton ( -2001 are classified as left, Regan (1981 Regan ( -1989 , G.H.W. Bush (1989 Bush ( -1993 and G.W. Bush (2001 Bush ( -2009 as right. For the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher (1979 -1990 ) is classified as right, while Tony Blair (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) as left. Italian leaders belonging to the Christian Democratic party (Democrazia Cristiana) are classified as centrist for the period 1975-1983 and 1988-1992 . In some specification I use the dummy same orientation ijt which equals one if the chief executives in exporter and importer countries are both left-wing, both centrist, or both right-wing. This is to test whether arms trade is dictated by friendship and strategic considerations, as documented by Alesina and Dollar (2000) for international aid. I also include the concentration index Herf indahl it which is the sum of the squared seats shares of all parties in the exporter's parliament and measures the relative power of the party in power: an higher value of the index means lower political competition. Finally, the dummy end term it equals one if the the exporter's executive is serving the last year of the current term and there is no specific rule limiting re-election. On the other side, end last term it equals one if the exporter's executive is serving the last year of the current term and it cannot be (immediately) re-elected. Other time-invariant country characteristics (such as whether the country has common vs. civil law, or a parliamentary vs. presidential system) are taken into account by the fixed effect.
Armed conflicts in the importing country may proxy for the MCW demand side. Data on conflicts come from the Armed Conflict Database provided by the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). This dataset provides detailed information on the type and the severity of conflicts that took place between independent states and/or political factions from 1946 onwards. Conflicts are classified in three categories: interstate armed conflict (which occurs between two or more states), internal armed conflict (which occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states) and internationalized internal armed conflict (which occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups with intervention from other states).
10 In my specifications, I include three dummies conf lict A jt , conf lict B jt and conf lict C jt which equal one if there is an interstate, internal or internationalized internal conflict in act between the importing country and a third part respectively. When a country has two or more conflicts in the same year, I take the most severe one, according to the following decreasing order of severity: interstate, internationalized internal, internal.
Data for per capita GDP and population, which proxy for countries' supply and demand potentials, come from the Penn World Table Version 6.2 (2007) provided by the Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania. The variables pgdp it and pgdp jt refer to the countries' per capita GDP (expressed in thousands of US$), while pop it and pop jt refer to the countries' population (in millions of inhabitants).
In the international market for arms, a formal obstacle to trade is represented by international embargoes, which are relatively frequent and whose effectiveness is highly controversial. There are several types of embargo: international organizations such as the UN, the OECD or the EU impose mandatory or non-mandatory embargoes, and some countries also initiate unilateral export restrictions. I restrict my attention to UN mandatory arms embargoes and retrieve my information combining UN secretariat sources and the dataset on international arms embargoes provided by SIPRI: the dummy embargo jt equals one if the importer country is under a UN mandatory arms embargo regime at time t.
Since geographical and cultural factors correlate with trade, I control for distance ij which refers to the average distance between the two countries in thousands of kilometers (Gledistch and Ward, 2001) . Trade exchanges lead to a diplomatic familiarity and an economic interdependence that may facilitate MCW transfers, and therefore I include total trade ijt representing trade flows between the two countries expressed in billions of US$. These data come from the Expanded Trade and GDP Dataset described in Gledistch (2002).
All democratic MCW exporters proclaim an ideological concern for human rights and a firm rejection of their abuse. Thus in some specification I also explicitly control for the level of human right violations in the importer country. Data come from the Political Terror Scale dataset (2008) that measures states' human rights record from Amnesty International and the US State Department. I choose the score derived from Amnesty International reports: human rights jt represents human rights violations in act in the importer country on a five-point interval scale, where a higher score indicates more severe violations.
Descriptive statistics are reported in tables 1 and 2.
Results

Democracies vs. Autocracies
Since my goal is to study the impact of politics on arms exports, I set a first distinction based on the nature of the political regime: whether it is democratic or autocratic. In fact democracies and autocracies may weigh economic and political incentives differently. Moreover, since trade liberalization does not apply to autocratic regimes, there is no a priori reason why left and right autocracies should differ with respect to arms exporting policy. In what follows I provide evidence that democracies and autocracies differ in their MCW exporting behavior.
The results presented in Table 3 are based on the full sample of twenty exporters, where democracies which are 87% of the sample account for about 65% of total MCW exports. All results refer to a fixed-effects gravity-type TOBIT where the dependent variable is arms ijt . In column (1) a specification with no interactions is presented. The dummy democracy it captures disparities in overall MCW exporting behavior. In addition to the baseline characteristics (per capita GDP and population of exporter and importer), I control for embargoes and conflicts in the importer country, ad for a dummy expressing the same political orientation. A dummy post Cold W ar t , which takes value one for years 1990 onwards, is there to capture the sudden worldwide demilitarization which brought a reduction of 40% in military expenditure and international arms transfers (See Skons, 2000; Dunne et al., 2003) . post Cold W ar t and same orientation ijt are also and interacted, in order to take into account the changes in the international scenario: during the Cold War political orientation also reflected bloc division, while after 1989 a major political break and a simultaneous MCW market restructuring took place. In column (2) all regressors of column (1) are interacted with the dummy democracy it . This is a straightforward test to check whether democracies and autocracies differ in any of the previous dimensions.
Results suggest that, once we account for country-specific effects, democracies tend to export more MCW. Also, the interaction terms in column (2) are significant. Exporter's per capita GDP is always positively correlated with MCW exports, but for democracies the effect is much smaller. In contrast, exporter's population is positive for autocracies, but negative for democracies. For what concerns importer's characteristics pgdp jt and pop jt , democracies tend to export MCW to rich countries while autocracies tend to export to poor countries, and importer's population has much more (positive) impact on democracies. Since population and GDP proxy for importer's willingness to pay, this can be interpreted as democratic exporters being more sensitive to pure economic incentives. Embargo policies seem to impact autocracies' exports only. In case of an interstate armed conflict (type A) autocracies tend to export MCW while democracies tend not to. When the conflict is internal (type B) the coefficient is positive and the interaction term is not significant, while in case of internationalized internal conflicts (type C) both types of regime tend to decrease MCW exports, but the negative effect is more modest for democracies. The fact that importer and exporter share the same political orientation (both left-wing, or right-wing, or centrist) always has a positive effect, which as expected decreases in magnitude after the Cold War. However, this effect is very little for democracies and much bigger for autocracies. The post Cold W ar t dummy reconfirms the sudden drop in MCW exports after 1989 ( Figure 1 ) and its interaction with democracy it suggests that the drop was more at the expenses of democracies, who were set on an higher export level before.
The Political Conditions of Democratic Exporters
The previous subsection has shown how democracies and autocracies differ with respect to MCW exporting behavior. I now restrict my attention to the sub sample of democratic exporters (excluding USSR, Czechoslovakia, China, Poland 1950 -1988 , Brazil 1964 -1984 and explore how internal political conditions impact MCW export 11 halshs-00585982, version 1 -14 Apr 2011 policies. Table 4 still refer to a fixed-effects gravity-type panel TOBIT where the dependent variable arms ijt is the amount of MCW transferred in a given year. Column (1) contains the baseline specification which covers the entire period 1975-2004. The regressors included are: exporter's political variables (whether the executive is centrist or left-wing, the concentration index Herf indahl it , and two dummies equal to one if the government is serving the last year of the current term with or without immediate re-election respectively), per capita GDP and population of exporter and importer, embargoes and conflicts in act in the importer country, a dummy for the same political orientation (both left-wing, or right-wing, or centrist), and a dummy for the post Cold War period interacted with same orientation ijt to capture bloc division.
Results in
In columns (2) and (3) the regressors are the same as in the baseline, but the exporters' sample is restricted. In column (2) only strongly democratic exporters (polity indicator of 6 and above) are considered. In column (3) I exclude the US (which has always ranked first in MCW exports from the 1950's onwards and which still nowadays exports the majority of the world's weapons).
In column (4) I add trade-related controls: the exporter-specific trend in arms outflows M CW exports it , the distance between the two countries, and the value of the bilateral generic trade flows in that given year. Due to data availability, this specification restricts the time span to 1975-2000.
All democracies proclaim an ideological concern for human rights and democratic governance. In line with previous studies (Blanton, 2000) column (5) controls for the democracy score (in a scale from -10 to +10) and human rights violations in the importing country. I also interact the importer's democracy score with the post Cold War dummy: during Cold War the countries in the Eastern bloc were classified as non-democratic, so in principle democracies' reluctance to export to non-democratic countries might have been just due to the fact that many of those countries were part of the Eastern bloc. Table 4 are consistent across specifications and political variables show interesting patterns. The exporter's chief executive being right-wing has a positive and significant impact on MCW exports. This may reflect a general right-wing tendency to lower trade barriers, with its consequences on deregularization of heavy industry exports, or a greater importance of national industry in political agenda, resulting in a higher economic support toward heavy armament sector. With the information we have, there is no way to disentangle those various mechanisms. The concentration index Herf indahl it is negative and significant: high political competition seem to be associated with high MCW exports. For what concerns the end of the executive's current term, results are particularly neat: if there is no specific rule limiting re-election (end term it equals one) the coefficient is negative and significant. That is, democratic executives decrease their MCW export when running the campaign for re-election. Instead, if the executive cannot be immediately re-elected (end last term it equals one) the coefficient is significantly positive and bigger in magnitude: when the mandate is expiring MCW exports increase significantly. This evidence is interesting but hardly surprising, as the public scrutiny of democratic voters is sensitive to arms-related arguments.
All other results go in the expected direction. The exporter having a higher per capita GDP and being less populous increases the quantity of MCW traded, as in Table 3. On the other side, per capita GDP and population of the importer, which may proxy for its likelihood to pay in the MCW open market, are positively significant. UN embargoes pending on the importer country are negative, but only significant in three out of five specifications, in line with the high rate of non-compliance reported by anecdotic and official sources (Amnesty International, IANSA, and Oxfam International, 2006) . For what concerns the conflicts in the importer country, internal conflicts (type B) and internal internationalized conflicts (type C) are positive and significant. The only exception is the negative sign of internal internationalized conflicts for highly democratic exporters (column 2). Interstate conflicts (type A) are always negative, but only occasionally significant. The dummy post Cold W ar t is negative itself (apart a small positive effect for the highly democratic exporters), consistently with the general crisis in the industry that led to a reduction of 40% in military expenditure and international arms transfers (Skons, 2000; Dunne et al., 2003) . The coefficient of same orientation ijt is positive and significant, but the negatively-signed interaction with the post Cold War dummy more than compensates the main effect: after the Cold War there is no more space for strategic considerations of political friendships. In column (4) not surprisingly we find that the distance between countries is negatively 13 halshs-00585982, version 1 -14 Apr 2011 significant and that bilateral trade flows are positively significant. Exporters' market trends M CW exports it appear negative, which is compatible with the low flexibility of heavy industry supply. For what regards column (5), only the importer's democracy score seems positively significant, while its interaction with the post Cold War dummy is not. Also importer's human rights violations seem not to affect MCW trade.
Conclusions
All through the XXth century arms have been not only tradable goods, but also foreign policy instruments. Politics can influence arms trade through several channels: regulation is country's sovereignty, export licenses are exclusively granted by governmental agencies, a relevant share of the armament industry is state property, and the arms production sector attracts subsidies and other measures in defense of national industry. This paper focuses on major conventional weapons (MCW) and investigates whether exporter's internal political conditions impact the quantity of MCW supplied to third countries. For this purpose, a gravity-type TOBIT equation is estimated for years . Results suggest that the determinants of MCW supply for autocratic and democratic regimes differ. For what concerns democracies, the government in power being right-wing significantly increases the quantity of MCW exported. This may reflect a general right-wing tendency to deregulate trade, or a greater support toward the national armament sector. I also find that lower political competition in the parliament (as expressed by the Herfindahl index) associates with lower MCW exports. Finally, data suggests that arms trade is particularly affected during the electoral campaign: democratic executives serving the last year of their current term tend to increase MCW exports if they cannot be immediately re-elected, and to decrease MCW exports if they can run for re-election. The contribution of the paper is to use longitudinally comparative data and a sound quantitative framework to shed light on the political determinants of arms trade along the XXth century. The trade in arms is a debated topic involving political institutions, ethic and economic considerations: a better understanding of its mechanisms is necessary to design an efficient regulation, and this paper is hopefully a step in this direction. 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 SIPRI indicator 1975-2004 1975-2004 1975-2004 1975-2000 1980-2000 an end user document must normally be submitted with the application. There are three types of end user certificate: an official EUC (for government end users); a private EUC (for company or private end users) and an International Import Certificate (IIC). Licensing Negotiations: no authorization required for negotiating a contract; a special license is required for deals by intermediaries regarding the procurement of war weapons which are located abroad and are to be delivered to the foreign customer without encountering German territory. Licensing Exemptions: in certain cases, such as insignificant parts of firearms, military equipment can be exported under a general license. Revocation Licenses: possible only under narrow legal conditions such as a false statement in a license application. Types of Licenses: there is no distinction between licenses based on destination; exports within the framework of an intergovernmental cooperation project are covered by a general license. Requirements: an end-user certificate is required for all destinations. However, the certificate can take different forms depending on the destination. Import certificates and delivery verification certificates are not verified if provided by the governmental authorities of the importing countries. The end-user certificate also includes a no reexport statement regarded as a contractual obligation between Italy and the importing country. Licensing Negotiations: license applications are examined on a case by case basis. Prior authorisation is required before a contract is signed. Licensing Ex-emptions: the 1990 Law No. 185/90 does not apply to the following: a) temporary exports directly effected by, or on behalf of the Central Government, to implement its own arms and equipment programmes for the armed forces and police; b) exports or concessions between governments for the purposes of military aid, under the terms of international agreements; c) the transit of armaments and equipment to meet the needs of allied countries, as defined in the Convention on the Status of NATO Forces, provided that waivers to Articles VI, XI, XII, XIII and XIV of the Convention between the States signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty are not invoked for any reason whatsoever. Revocation Licenses: licenses can be revoked at any time. Types of Licenses: a national register of companies operating in the field of planning, manufacture, import, export, maintenance and servicing of military products is maintained.
Only companies in the register may receive permission to negotiate contracts for exports of military list items. Only individual licenses are used. Special conditions can be attached to an individual license (normally valid for 1 year) on a case-by-case basis. if nuclear issues are present; 3) the relevant services decide whether requests are of major importance regarding foreign or security policy and thus must be submitted to the Federal Council; 4) if the relevant services cannot agree on the proper treatment of the requests the latter are submitted the Federal Council; 5) in cases of minor importance or if there are precedents, the relevant authorities can authorize the OFAEE to take decisions. End User Requirements: Art. 18 of law of 13 December stipulates that export authorizations are usually only issued for goods destined to foreign governments or companies working for foreign governments, and a declaration that the goods will not be reexported. The clause may not be required for parts destined to be integrated (and are integrated) and then exported or for anonymous parts of negligible value. Licensing Negotiations: initial authorization required for commercial activity including the process of offering, acquiring, and transferring. Brokerage and transfer of intellectual property also subject to authorization (art. 6 ,9, and 20 of law of 13 December 1996). Licensing Exemptions: the licensing scheme is not applicable to armament companies when their activities are related to acquisition of material for the Swiss army (art. 4 of law of 13 December). 2) technical assistance agreements: a contract for the delivery of a defense service or disclosure of technical data; 3) manufacturing licenses: a document whereby a US legal person grants a foreign person authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad; 4) distribution agreements: a contract to establish a warehouse or distribution point abroad for defense articles exported from the US for subsequent distribution to entities in an approved sales territory.
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